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The boundaries of partisan gerrymandering
n my most recent column, I ex
pressed concern about the effec
tiveness of the constitutional deci
sion rules that currently govern ger
rymandering - the redrawing of elec
toral districts in a manner that favors
the incumbent majority at the ex
pense of those out of power.
Briefly, the Constitution has not
been interpreted to prohibit redis
tricting with an eye toward advancing
the interests of the political party in
power. But it has been interpreted to
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bar legislators from redistricting on
racial grounds - at least in most cir
cumstances.
The problem is that voters from
certain racial groups tend to vote
overwhehningly for a single party.
Thus, one way to gain partisan advan
tage in racially diverse states is to di
lute the voting power of racial groups
who tend to vote for the other party.
This is accomplished by either "pack
ing" voters from these groups into
districts the other party is going to

win anyway, or "cracking" them into a
number of different legislative dis
tricts so that they fall somewhat short
of a majority in each one.
As matters now stand, redistrict
ing that results in such packing and
cracking is constitutional if a court
finds that its "predominant purpose"
was merely to secure partisan advan
tage. But it is unconstitutional ifa
court finds that racial motivations
SEE CONSTITUTION 04

New gerrymandering case may all come down to Justice Anthony Kennedy
court with an opportunity to
hold that the Constitution
places limits on partisan ger
predominated.
rymandering even where a
As a consequence, if the
racial motivation is not shown.
law remains as it is, we can
expect that state legislatures
Gill arose from a constitu
will simply engage in a form of tional challenge to partisan
kabuki theater when they re
gerrymandering carried out
district. They will fill the leg
by the Republican-controlled
Wisconsin state legislature in
islative record with refer
ences to their naked partisan 2011, following the 2010 na
tional census. (State legisla
goals - and scrub it of refer
ences to race - in order to per tures redistrict every 10 years
to account for population
suade the courts to find that
politics, and not race, predom changes recorded in the most
recent census.)
inated in their decision-mak
ing.
As a result of this gerry
mandering, in 2012, Republi
On the ground, little will
change - at least so long as
cans won 60 out of 99 seats in
Wisconsin's general assembly
voters do not punish legisla
even though they secured
tors who engage in partisan
gerrymandering.
only 48.6 percent of the
This is why so many ob
statewide vote. And in 2014,
servers are closely watching
they won 63 out of 99 seats
the progress of Gill v. Whit
with a mere 52 percent of the
ford, a case from Wisconsin
statewide vote.
that the Supreme Court may
Democratic voters sued
decide to take up as early as
and claimed that the legisla
this week. Gill presents the
ture's action violated their
CONSmuTION FROM D1

First Amendment associa
tional rights and 14th Amend
ment equal protection rights.
By a 2-1 vote, a federal trial
court agreed and upheld their
claims. (There are special
procedural provisions, includ
ing one for a three-judge trial
court, that are used in elec
tion law cases of this sort.) In
a subsequent order, the court
directed the Wisconsin legis
lature to redistrict in a less
partisan manner.
What makes the case po
tentially so important is that
the court found both that
there are judicially manage
able decision rules under
which the plaintiffs' claims
may be adjudicated, and that
the Wisconsin legislature's
conduct was unconstitutional
under those rules.
Specifically, the court ac
cepted and applied an innova
tive mathematical formula
proposed by the plaintiffs that
measures whether candidates

for the winning party received
a disproportionately smaller
number of "wasted votes" 
the extra votes for winning
candidates that were not
needed to win, and all votes
cast for losing candidates 
than candidates for the losing
party. And the court then held
that the gap between the
large number of wasted votes
cast for Democrats, and the
relatively small number of
wasted votes cast for Republi
cans, was unconstitutionally
large.
In the past, a number of
Supreme Court justices have
expressed doubt that partisan
gerrymandering is consistent
with the First and 14th
Amendments. But a majority
of the court has never been
able to agree on a standard
that marks an appropriate
constitutional boundary. For
this reason, several other jus
tices have opined that no such
standard exists, and that

claims of unconstitutional par
tisan gerrymandering are not
susceptible to judicial review.
If the court decides to re
view the Wisconsin ruling on
its merits, the justices will
probably divide into at least
two camps. The court's more
conservative justices will
likely remain unpersuaded
that partisan gerrymandering
claims are a proper subject of
judicial review. But its more
liberal justices will likely be
more inclined to see the case
as justiciable, and may well be
receptive to the approach
taken by the lower court.
As has so often been the
case in recent years, it may all
come down to Justice An
thony Kennedy.
In a 2004 case, Justice
Kennedyjoined with a conser
vative plurality in rejecting a
claim of unconstitutional par
tisan gerrymandering. But he
did not agree with the plural
ity that such claims could

never be properly adjudi
cated. Rather, he preferred to
leave the door open to the
eventual emergence of judi
cially manageable decision
rules to evaluate such claims.
Will counting and compar
ing wasted votes - as the WlS
consin court has done - strike
Justice Kennedy as an appro
priate and judicially manage
able method for operationaliz
ing constitutional limits on
partisan gerrymandering?
Stay tuned. And recognize
that, if the lower court's deci
sion in Gill is upheld, the ef
fect on redistricting after the
2020 census could be pro
found
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